
#### EXERCISE 23

#### POINTS-TO ANALYSIS REVIEW

#### Write your name and answer the following on a piece of paper

Draw the points-to graph of the following snippet:



Assignment	Constraint
a = &b	a ⊇ { b }
a = b	a⊇b
a = *b	a ⊇ *b
*a = b	*a ⊇ b

# EXERCISE 23 SOLUTION POINTS-TO ANALYSIS REVIEW

Assignment	Constraint
a = &b	a ⊇ { b }
a = b	a⊇b
a = *b	a ⊇ *b
*a = b	*a ⊇ b

#### EXERCISE 23

#### POINTS-TO ANALYSIS REVIEW

#### Write your name and answer the following on a piece of paper


Draw the points-to graph of the following snippet:



Assignment	Constraint	
a = &b	a ⊇ { b }	
a = b	a⊇b	
a = *b	a ⊇ *b	
*a = b	*a ⊇ b	


# EXERCISE 23 SOLUTION POINTS-TO ANALYSIS REVIEW

Assignment	Constraint
a = &b	a ⊇ { b }
a = b	a⊇b
a = *b	a ⊇ *b
*a = b	*a ⊇ b



ADMINISTRIVIA AND ANNOUNCEMENTS Quiz 2 on Monday

Review session: Friday at 6:30 PM, Location TBA



EECS 677: Software Security Evaluation

**Drew Davidson** 

#### **ANDERSEN'S ALGORITHM**

**REVIEW: LAST LECTURE** 

#### REACHABILITY FORMULATION

**Step 1:** Extract pointer-related operations

**Step 2:** Saturate points-to graph

**Step 3:** Compute node reachability

Assignment	Constraint	Meaning
a = &b	a ⊇ {b}	$loc(b) \in pts(a)$
a = b	a ⊇ b	pts(a) ⊇ pts(b)
a = *b	a ⊇ *b	$\forall v \in pts(b). pts(a) \supseteq pts(v)$
*a = b	*a ⊇ b	$\forall v \in pts(a). pts(v) \supseteq pts(b)$

#### ANDERSEN'S ALGORITHM: REACHABILITY

**REVIEW: LAST LECTURE** 

#### REACHABILITY FORMULATION

**Step 1:** List pointer-related operations

**Step 2:** Saturate points-to graph

**Step 3:** Compute node reachability


<u>Program</u>	<u>Constraints</u>
p = &a	p ⊇ {a}

$$p = \&b \qquad p \supseteq \{b\}$$

$$m = &p$$
  $m \supseteq \{p\}$ 

$$q = &c$$
  $q \supseteq \{c\}$ 

$$m = &q$$
  $m \supseteq \{q\}$ 



Assignment	ignment Constraint Meaning	
a = &b	a ⊇ {b}	$loc(b) \in pts(a)$
a = b	$a = b$ $a \supseteq b$ $pts(a) \supseteq pts($	
a = *b	a ⊇ *b	$\forall v \in pts(b). pts(a) \supseteq pts(v)$
*a = b	*a ⊇ b	$\forall v \in pts(a). pts(v) \supseteq pts(b)$

$$pts(a) = { }$$
  $pts(a) = { }$ 

$$pts(r) = \{ \}$$
  $pts(r) = \{ a, b, c \}$ 

#### POINTS TO AND TYPE SAFTEY


**REVIEW: LAST LECTURE** 

#### A "FEATURE" OF THE ANALYSIS

Our points-to relationships are somewhat contrived

Would a program ever actually have both of these statements?






EECS 677: Software Security Evaluation

**Drew Davidson** 

### LECTURE OUTLINE

- Steensgard's Analysis
- Static Analysis Underview
- Program Instrumentation



### **OVERHEAD**ANDERSEN'S ANALYSIS


#### WORST CASE: CUBIC TIME

That's not great!

Most of the time is spent in re-analyzing constraints to get to a fixpoint

### OPTIMIZATION: CYCLE ELIMINATION


Detect and collapse SCCs in the points-to relation



### A MORE-EFFICIENT POINTS-TO STEENSGARD'S ANALYSIS

#### RETURN AGAIN TO OUR ANCIENT WISDOM

Simpler abstractions reach fixpoints faster



### A MORE-EFFICIENT POINTS-TO STEENSGARD'S ANALYSIS

#### RETURN AGAIN TO OUR ANCIENT WISDOM

Simpler abstractions reach fixpoints faster

#### STEENGARD'S ANALYSIS

Limit the points-to graph nodes to have outdegree <= 1

Simplifies many points-to constraints from subsets to equalities

Achieves near-linear performance

You can only point to 1 node

If you need to point to > 1 node, merge the "pointees"

#### STEENGARD'S ALGORITHM

AN EFFICIENT OVER-APPROXIMATION

### IN PRACTICE AMONTHY

Step 1

List pointer-related operations

Step 2

equality

Induce set of subset constraints

Step 3

Solve system of constraints

#### REACHABILITY FORMULATION

Step 1

List pointer-related operations

Step 2

1-out

Saturate points-to graph

Step 3

Compute node reachability

#### Andersen's

Assignment	Constraint	Meaning
a = &b	a ⊇ {b}	$loc(b) \in pts(a)$
a = b	a ⊇ b	pts(a) ⊇ pts(b)
a = *b	a ⊇ *b	$\forall v \in pts(b). pts(a) \supseteq pts(v)$
*a = b	*a ⊇ b	$\forall v \in pts(a). pts(v) \supseteq pts(b)$

#### Steengaard's

Assignment	Assignment Constraint Meaning	
a = &b	a ⊇ {b}	$loc(b) \in pts(a)$
a = b	a = b	pts(a) = pts(b)
a = *b	a = *b	$\forall v \in pts(b). pts(a) = pts(v)$
*a = b	*a = b	$\forall v \in pts(a). pts(v) = pts(b)$

# EQUALITY CONSTRAINTS STEENSGARD'S ANALYSIS

Constraint type	Assignment	Constraint	Meaning
Base	a = &b	a ⊇ {b}	loc(b) ∈ pts(a)
Simple	a = b	a = b	pts(a) = pts(b)
Complex	a = *b	a = *b	$\forall v \in pts(b). pts(a) = pts(v)$
Complex	*a = b	*a = b	$\forall v \in pts(a). pts(v) = pts(b)$

С

### **EQUALITY CONSTRAINTS**

STEENSGARD'S AMALYSIS

p a,b

m = &p


m p a,b

r = \*m

q = &c

 $m \rightarrow p \rightarrow a,b \leftarrow r$ 

m = &q



 $m \rightarrow p,q \rightarrow a,b,c \qquad r$ 

## EQUALITY CONSTRAINTS STEENSGARD'S ANALYSIS




r = &p

q = &y

s = &q

r = s



### THAT'S POINTS-TO! STEENSGARD'S ANALYSIS


#### AN ADDITIONAL OVERLAY ON DATAFLOW

Dataflow facts also flow to aliases

When dereferencing a pointer, consider only pointed-to objects

### LECTURE OUTLINE

- Steensgard's Analysis
- Static Analysis Underview
- Program Instrumentation



#### STATIC ANALYSIS READY TO GO!

STATIC ANALYSIS UNDERVIEW

DATAFLOW ANALYSIS CAN BE ADOPTED FOR CHECKING A VARIETY OF SECURITY / CORRECTNESS PROPERTIES

Forms the basis of a lot of static analysis!

#### Applicable for a variety of analysis goals

- Security leak detection
- Vulnerable program state detection
- Program understanding



#### STATIC ANALYSIS: BENEFITS

STATIC ANALYSIS UNDERVIEW


#### "THE ANALYST'S SIEVE"

Focus your attention on potential issues

#### Non-interactive!

Can run in the background

Abstraction obviates need for input




#### LIMITS OF STATIC ANALYSIS

PROGRAM INSTRUMENTATION: BASIC IDEA


#### PRACTICAL ISSUES

- Unsoundness of bug finding / incompleteness of program verification
- Scalability
- Significant engineering effort
- Findings may not be super actionable



### LECTURE OUTLINE

- Steensgard's Analysis
- Static Analysis Underview
- Program Instrumentation



#### **REVISING DYNAMIC ANALYSIS**

PROGRAM INSTRUMENTATION: BASIC IDEA

#### GIVING UP ON COMPLETE BUG-FINDING

- Finding bugs (even "low-hanging fruit") is useful!

#### BENEFITS

- Scalability
- Sound bug finding



#### **BEYOND TESTING**

PROGRAM INSTRUMENTATION: BASIC IDEA

#### LIMITATIONS OF "PLAIN" TESTING

- Property may not be immediately observable from output alone
- The circumstances under which the issue occurs may not be obvious



#### PROGRAM INSTRUMENTATION

PROGRAM INSTRUMENTATION: BASIC IDEA

### WRITE CODE INTO THE EXECUTABLE TO GATHER INFORMATION

Addresses both of the previous issues – can report upon program state and even program path



#### **EXAMPLE: LLVM INSTRUMENTATION**

PROGRAM INSTRUMENTATION: BASIC IDEA

### WRITE CODE INTO THE EXECUTABLE TO GATHER INFORMATION

Addresses both of the previous issues – can report upon program state and even program path



#### **INSERTING PROGRAM PROBES**

PROGRAM INSTRUMENTATION: BASIC IDEA

### INSERT CHECKS / REPORTS INTO THE ANALYSIS TARGET


Addresses both of the previous issues – can report upon program state and even program path

# A NEW CONCERN — THE EFFICIENCY OF THE (INSTRUMENTED) PROGRAM

Potential slowdown on each program path

### OLD CONCERN - THE EFFICIENCY OF PLACEMENT ANALYSIS

Somewhat limited by the information the probes can report



#### **EXAMPLE: CODE COVERAGE**

PROGRAM INSTRUMENTATION: BASIC IDEA

bece ator (c/1)
a/b/



#### **EXAMPLE: CODE COVERAGE**

PROGRAM INSTRUMENTATION: BASIC IDEA

# COUNTING HOW MANY TIMES CERTAIN BEHAVIORS OF THE PROGRAM ARE EXERCISED


Why is this useful? (Placing sanitizers)

### THIS ACTUALLY TURNS OUT TO BE A LITTLE BIT TRICKY!

Actually turns out to be a little bit tricky!

We'll describe some of the issues / solution as per Ball and Larus, '96





#### **WRAP-UP**

WE'VE BEGUN TO CONSIDER A WAY TO MOVE BEYOND STATIC ANALYSIS WHILE USING OUR EXISTING TOOLS: PROGRAM INSTRUMENTATION